| 讲座简介： | Abstract: This paper studies a generalized many-to-many matching problem with ties. The complications in such a problem are due to multi-unit capacities and weak preferences, either of which could make a stable matching outcome not necessarily Pareto efficient. A natural solution concept is Pareto stability, which ensures both stability and Pareto efficiency. We show that a Pareto stable matching always exists and develop an efficient algorithm to compute one. For a practical matching market design problem where one side of the market has homogeneous preferences, for instance, course allocation, we propose two new competing Pareto stable mechanisms known as the Pareto-improving draft and dictatorship mechanisms. Using unique course matching data, our simulations show that both mechanisms can significantly improve the overall efficiency and welfare of students compared to the existing mechanism, with the draft mechanism outperforming the dictatorship mechanism despite its non-strategyproofness for the students. |
